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1. Team reasoning 
 The theory of team reasoning was developed separately by Robert Sugden (1993, 2000, 
2003) and Michael Bacharach (1999, 2006). Its development was motivated by games that are 
puzzling for orthodox game theory because they have an arguably rational solution, which a 
substantial number of people play in real life, whose play game theory cannot explain or predict. 
  One of these games is Hi-Lo, a version of which is shown in Figure 1. There are two pure-
strategy Nash equilibria, (high, high) and (low, low), and (high, high) is strictly better than (low, 
low) for both players. It seems clear that the two players should each play high. However standard 
game theory cannot recommend that. A Nash equilibrium involves a player maximizing her payoff 
given what the other player is doing. Thus it can only recommend that, if a player expects the other 
player to play high, then it is rational for her to play high. However, if she expects the other player 
to play low, then it is rational for her to play low. What it is rational for Player 1 to do is conditional 
on what Player 2 does, and standard game theory gives her no reason to expect Player 2 to play high 
rather than low. (For fuller statements of this argument, see Hodgson (1967), Sugden (1993), or 
Bacharach (2006).) 
      
       Player 2 
      high  low 
 Player 1  high  2, 2  0, 0 
    low  0, 0  1, 1     
              




 The other game is the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a version of which is shown in Figure 2. The 
only Nash equilibrium in this game is (defect, defect); indeed defect is a dominant strategy, a player 
is better off playing it whatever the other player does, so standard game theory recommends to each 
player that she play it regardless of her expectations about the other player. However, (defect, 
defect) leaves both players worse off than if they had played (cooperate, cooperate). 
 
       Player 2 
      cooperate  defect 
 Player 1  cooperate 3, 3   0, 4 
    defect  4, 0   1, 1     
              
Figure 1:  Hi-Lo 
 
 In standard game theoretic reasoning, an individual player asks “what do I want to achieve 
and what should I do to achieve it (given my beliefs about what other players will do)?” The answer 
is a complete strategy, roughly speaking a contingency plan, which she then carries out. Team 
reasoning extends the syntax of game theory, to allow players to ask “what do we want to achieve 
and what should I do to play my part in achieving it?”. This allows each player to choose the best 
profile of actions for the team and reach the conclusion that she should choose her component of 
that profile. Team reasoning de-conditionalizes players’ choices, allowing profile selection. 
 A player team reasons when she group identifies, conceiving of herself as part of a team, 
where the group is a unit of agency, acting as a single entity in pursuit of some single objective. 
Then, provided that there is common knowledge that each member group identifies and common 
knowledge of the best team profile, she will choose her part of the best profile for the group. (For 
discussion of what happens when we relax the common knowledge conditions and when the team 
of actors is smaller than the whole group, and how different theorists deal with it, see Gold & 
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Sugden, 2007b; Gold, 2012.) In the Hi-Lo game it is clear that (high, high) would be the best profile 
of actions for the team so, in the simplest case, if there is common knowledge that each member 
group identifies and common knowledge that each member aims to choose the best team profile, 
then each can reason that she should play high, as a part of playing (high, high). In a similar 
manner, if the best team profile in the prisoner’s dilemma is (cooperate, cooperate) and the 
common knowledge conditions are fulfilled, then team reasoning can predict that players will 
choose cooperate (Gold & Sugden, 2007b). 
 This is the common core of the theory of team reasoning. It leaves open questions about 
what exactly it is to group identify, whether it can be rational to group identify, and what the team 
should take as its goal. These are answered in different ways by Sugden, Bacharach, and others who 
have written about team reasoning. Other open research questions include how to test the theory, 
the relation of team reasoning to collective intentions, what is the role of reasoning, and the 
application of team reasoning to other levels of agency. Each of these is the subject of a section 
below. 
 
2. Group identification 
 An individual is said to group identify if she conceives of herself as part of a team, where 
the group is a unit of agency, acting as a single entity in pursuit of some single objective. (Strictly 
speaking, we should separate “entification”, where an individual conceives of a group as a unity of 
agency, or team, from “identification”, where she identifies herself as a part of that group agent. But 
we will simplify and just speak of identification here.) A team reasoner must first come to frame a 
decision as a problem for “us” and then do team reasoning. But theorists disagree about how group 
identification happens and what exactly it entails. In order to better understand these differences, I 
will locate them in a more general framework of decision-making. 
 We can distinguish three steps involved in framing and decision-making: noticing, noticing 
as choice-relevant, and deciding to act on a reason (Gold, 2012). Standard decision theory only 
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recognises individual agents, but the setting up of those agents’ decision-problems still involves the 
three steps. There is are an infinite number of ways of describing a situation. As finite individuals, 
we cannot see them all at once. The way that a situation is described or “framed” conveys 
information about the situation. For a fact to become the basis of an agent’s reason for action (her 
“motivating reason”), first she must notice it. The agent can only reason from premises about the 
world that are accessible to her, so frames set the parameters of reasoning. But noticing alone is not 
enough. For the fact to influence an agent’s decision, she must also recognise that it is relevant to 
her choice and is a potential reason for action. Finally, the agent must act on the reason, it must 
have a “motivational grip”. 
 We can apply this framework to team reasoning. Standard decision theory only recognises 
individual agents. Once we allow that there can be different levels of agency, it matters whether the 
individual frames herself and her co-players only as individuals, using an “I-frame”, or as a team, 
using a “we-frame”. First the agent must see the possibility of cooperation and notice the potential 
for team reasoning, then she must group identify and see team reasoning as choice-relevant; third 
she must decide to act on team reasoning. So, once the agent notices the possibility of acting as a 
team, there are two more steps to becoming a team reasoner. We might think of the second of these 
steps, noticing as choice-relevant, as group identification.  
 There is disagreement about whether these steps are filled by psychological processes or 
choices. In Bacharach’s theory of team reasoning, group identification is simply a psychological 
process. Salient features of the situation may promote group identification via affiliation, “a 
psychological process in which a person who does think about a certain group, defined by some 
shared property, comes to think about it as ‘us’” (Bacharach, 1997: 2). Amongst those salient 
features are the payoffs of the game. A feature’s effectiveness is its tendency to stimulate group 
identity. Both Hi-Lo and the Prisoner’s Dilemma have a feature that Bacharach called strong 
independence, roughly speaking a Nash equilibrium that is worse than some other outcome in the 
game from every player's individual point of view. Bacharach speculated that seeing the possibility 
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of  cooperating to achieve (high, high) instead of (low, low), or (cooperate, cooperate) instead of 
(defect, defect), would promote group identification. However, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the 
player may also see the double-crossing feature, whereby an individual can benefit if she 
unilaterally deviates from the team reasoning solution, which inhibits group identification.  
 For Bacharach, group identification then primes team reasoning: another psychological 
process. In most of Beyond Individual Choice, Bacharach assumes that once an individual group 
identifies, then she will always team reason (although he recognises in a footnote that this is a 
simplification, Bacharach, 2006: 152). Individuals either frame the decision as a problem for “me”, 
in which case they use individual reasoning, or they frame it as a problem for “us” and use team 
reasoning. (Hence, Bacharach’s theory has been referred to as producing team reasoning as a result 
of framing, see Gold and Sudden, 2007a, 2007b.) In other work, he allows that both the I-frame and 
the we-frame come to mind at the same time (Bacharach, 1997). Never-the-less, reasoning about 
whether or not to team reason does not enter the picture. 
 For Sugden, in contrast, both the step from noticing to group identification and the step from 
group identification to team reasoning are opportunities for choices. Assurance is necessary for 
group identification: “to construe oneself as a member of a team, one must have some confidence 
that the other members of that team construe themselves as members too’” (Sugden 2000: 194). 
Such assurance could be created by public acts of commitment or induced by repeated experience 
of regularities of behaviour in a population. But, even once an individual group identifies, she 
would still have to decide whether team reasoning was a mode of reasoning that she wanted to 
endorse. Assurance enters the picture again, as endorsing Sugden’s “mutually assured team 
reasoning” is to make a unilateral commitment to a certain form of practical reasoning, but that 
reasoning does not generate any implications for action unless one has assurance that others have 
made the same commitment.  
 This difference between Sugden and Bacharach, between their views of  how group 
identification occurs, also manifests in different ways of conceptualising the relationship between a 
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team reasoner and the group goal. For Bacharach, a team reasoner who identifies with the group 
takes on the goals of the group and will aim to do her part in what is best for the group, even when 
not all of the group are team reasoners. We might say in this situation that the “team” is smaller 
than the “group” whose interests are promoted by the team. In contrast, for Sugden, a team reasoner 
who identifies with a group stands ready to do her part in joint actions in pursuit of the group’s 
objective; but she does not necessarily take this objective as hers in the stronger sense of wanting to 
pursue it even if other members of the group do not reciprocate. 
 
3. The possibility of rational group identification 
 The theory of team reasoning allows that groups, as well as individuals, can be agents; and it 
shows how it can be rational to play high in Hi-Lo and cooperate  in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, given 
that a player group identifies. According to Hurley (1989:145) “an adequate theory of rational 
choice should address the question of what the unit of agency among those possible should be”. But 
neither Bacharach nor Sugden thinks that we can make an instrumentally rational choice to team 
reason. 
 For Bacharach, group identification is a psychological process that leads to team reasoning. 
Further, the evaluation of outcomes is always done by an agent within the perspective of one of the 
two frames, the I-frame or the we-frame (Bacharach, 1997). The standards of evaluation and goals 
are co-determined with the unit of agency; there is no agent-neutral perspective from which we can 
assess the rationality of team reasoning. All Bacharach can say is: given that an individual group 
identifies, then it is rational for her to team reason. 
 Even though, for Sugden, team reasoning is a matter of choice, he also does not think that it 
is a matter of instrumentally rational choice. Sugden does not acknowledge an agent-neutral concept 
of ‘“rationality”, or even of  the “validity” of reasoning. For Sugden, both individual reasoning and 
team reasoning are simply modes of reasoning that a person might endorse. As with Bacharach, all 
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goals are the goals of agents, so there is no instrumentally rational way to make assessments prior to 
determining the unit of agency. 
 Hurley differs, suggesting that a person should choose the unit of agency that best realises 
her goals, where these are chosen “according to one’s substantive goals and ethical views” (1989: 
147): “As an individual I can recognise that a collective unit of which I am merely a part can bring 
about outcomes that I prefer to any that I could bring about by acting as an individual unit” (Hurley, 
2005a: 203). Thus she makes team reasoning a matter of instrumental rationality.  
 There are two ways that Hurley’s position could be construed and they are both problematic. 
Hurley might mean that we should privilege individual level “substantive goals”; or she might mean 
that morality specifies agent-neutral goals, which ought to be pursued regardless of the unit of 
agency, but, since thinking usually occurs at the individual level, these will be determined by the 
individual’s “ethical views”. However, once we acknowledge that there are multiple levels of 
agency, it is not clear why one should privilege the individual level over the group level for the 
purpose of making evaluations (Bardsley, 2001).  
 Elizabeth Anderson and David Gauthier have also expressed the opinion that group 
identification (Anderson) or cooperation (Gauthier) is rational, but both admit to lacking an 
argument for this position.  
 Anderson maintains that morality requires  us to transcend our various identities and  
harmonise their demands, by identifying with a community that comprehends them all, the Kantian 
Kingdom of Ends. However, she admits to having no argument that this is rationally required  
(Anderson, 2001: 37). 
 Gauthier also argues that something like team reasoning could be instrumentally rational. 
Gauthier has long held that it can be instrumentally rational to cooperate in the Prisoner's Dilemma 
game (Gauthier, 1986). In a recent re-working of his theory, Gauthier (2013) claims that Pareto-
optimization is a necessary condition for rationality in multi-player games, where a Pareto-
optimizing theory “provides only a single set of directives to all the interacting agents, with the 
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directive to each premised on the acceptance by the others of the directives to them” (Gauthier 
2013: 607). The outcome selected must be both efficient and fair in how it distributes the expected 
gains of cooperation. Although he does not explicitly use the term “team reasoning”, it is clear that 
Gauthier's theory is similar to ideas of team reasoning for mutual gain. His goal is to show that 
“social morality is part of rational choice, or at least, integral to rational cooperation” (Gauthier, 
2013: 624). However, he does not provide a connection to practical rationality—his moral 
justification for team reasoning is that it would pass a contractarian test whereby it is “eligible for 
inclusion in an actual society that constitutes a cooperative venture for mutual fulfilment” 
(Gauthier, 2013: 618)—and he concedes that he has not yet been successful in bridging social 
morality and rational choice. 
 If team reasoning is rational, it looks like it is not instrumentally rational. Anderson (2001) 
expresses the hope that we can discover principles of rational self-identification. If we do, for the 
reasons given above, in the discussion of Hurley, then they will have to be thicker principles of 
rationality than instrumental ones. 
 
4. The team’s objective 
 In the Hi-Lo and Prisoner’s Dilemma games above, it is fairly obvious which outcome a 
team should aim at. In other situations, things may not be so clear. In particular, there may be a 
question of how the team should treat its members’ different interests and priorities. There are two 
main approaches to specifying the objectives of the team: to assume that a team, like an individual, 
has a utility function and to specify how individual team members’ interests should be traded off 
against each other; or to treat team reasoning as a form of mutual cooperation or bargaining and to 
describe what team outcomes the individual members would agree to. 
 Bacharach (2006) sees the team goal as being captured in a team payoff function and asks 
how the team function should relate to the payoff functions of the individual members (Ch. 2, 
Section 4.3). He argues that, at a minimum, the team function will be Paretian with respect to the 
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payoffs of the players, i.e., if every individual agent gets at least as much utility in outcome x than 
outcome y, and at least one agent does strictly better, then the group function will rank outcome x 
above outcome y. This will be enough to identify a preferred team outcome in coordination games, 
where players’ interests are aligned, but in mixed-motive games, where there is some conflict of 
interest—maybe because there are multiple possible cooperative solutions and different individuals 
do better in each one—we will need to supplement it with an account of how the team function 
adjudicates between the interests of different members. Bacharach (2006: 88) puts forwards as a 
“testable hypothesis” that “in circumstances in which nothing is perceived by individual members 
about other individual members beyond the facts recorded in a bare game representation, principles 
of fairness such as those of Nash's axiomatic bargaining theory will be embedded in U [the team 
function].”  
 One function that is Paretian is the utilitarian function. Many papers on team reasoning talk 
about maximizing the average of the players' payoffs, which is equivalent to the utilitarian function 
(Bacharach 1999, 2006; Colman et al., 2008, 2014; Smerilli, 2012). Allowing this sort of trade-off 
between individual members’ interests enables team reasoning to explain cases where one member 
sacrifices themselves for the rest of the team, for instance the martyrdom of one member for the 
good of the group. Maybe unsurprisingly, discussions of team reasoning that favour something like 
the utilitarian function are either psychological theories, such as Bacharach (2006), or moral ones, 
such as Regan (1980), who assumes that we should aim for a utilitarian outcome and asks what 
level of reasoning utilitarians should use. 
 An alternative way of conceptualising team reasoning is as cooperation for mutual 
advantage (Sugden, 2011). In this interpretation of the theory, an individual would not team reason 
if it would leave her individually worse off. Sugden (2015) proposes that we measure mutual 
advantage relative to the payoff that each player can guarantee herself in a game. A strategy profile 
where each player receives a payoff that is greater than this threshold and where each player’s 
participation is needed to attain these higher payoffs is said to be mutually beneficial. (There are 
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similarities to Gauthier, 2013. See Karpus and Gold, 2016 for more discussion.) Karpus and 
Radzvilas (2015) formalise these ideas of mutual advantage and mutual benefit, together with a 
Pareto efficiency criterion. Misyak and co-authors argue in a similar vein that we-thinking should 
be construed as virtual bargaining, where people reason about what they would agree on, if they 
were able to bargain. If it is obvious]’ which outcome they would agree on, then they can choose it 
directly without doing any actual bargaining (Misyak & Chater, 2014; Misyak, Melkonyan, 
Zeitoun, & Chater, 2014; Chater, Misyak, Melkonyan & Zeitoun, 2016). 
 The utilitarian function allows the sacrifice of some members for the good of others: as John 
Rawls (1999:164) put it, utilitarianism neglects the separateness of persons. In contrast, theories of 
team reasoning as mutual advantage will not allow this. They privilege the individual level of 
agency, in that the acceptable team outcomes are defined in terms of what would be acceptable to 
the individual members. 
 
5. Collective intentions and reasoning 
 The intentions that we have when we act together are collective intentions. If we decide to 
go to New York together, that you will buy the tickets and I will book the hotel, then there is a 
sense in which “we intend to go to New York”, as well as a sense in which “I” intend my part in our 
joint action. Most analyses of collective intentions focus on the properties of collective intentions as 
mental states, so anything that is distinctive to cooperative activity has to be represented as a 
distinctive feature of the corresponding intentions. However, Gold and Sugden (2007a) argue that 
collective intentions are distinguished from individual intentions by reference to the unit of agency 
in the reasoning that led to the formation of the intention; that collective intentions are the sort of 
intentions that are formed when people team reason.1  
																																																								
1 The idea that collective intentions result from team reasoning may be related to Tuomela’s (2006) idea of reasoning in 




 Pacherie (2011) argues that leading accounts of collective intentions, such as those of 
Bratman (2009a, 2009b) and Gilbert (1997, 2009), require too much sophistication on the part of 
agents and therefore cannot explain the intentions behind the cooperative actions of children, who 
do not have a sophisticated theory of the mental states of others. She argues that Bacharach’s theory 
of team reasoning gives an account of collective intentions that is less cognitively demanding and 
therefore to be preferred. 
 The team reasoning account of collective intentions is consistent with evidence from 
cognitive linguistics, which shows that we is composed of notions of I and grouphood (Gold & 
Harbour, 2012). These cognitive requirements would be satisfied by someone who has the 
individual concept I and the notion of grouped implicit in team reasoning. 
 The idea that collective intentions are the result of team reasoning has been criticised on the 
grounds that there are spontaneous collective intentions (Tuomela, 2009; Schweikard & Schmid, 
2013). There are a variety of things that could be meant by this criticism. One of them is that there 
are spontaneous collective intentions, which are not formed as the result of conscious reasoning. 
This raises the question of what is meant by “reasoning” in team reasoning. 
 Philosophers often take reasoning to mean conscious deliberation (e.g. Pettit, 2007). 
However, this is not normally how decision theorists think of reasoning. Amongst economists, 
patterns of consistent behaviour provide evidence of rationality and of the agent’s mental states 
which caused the behaviour; or, for more philosophical theories of rational choice, which relate it to 
practical reasoning, given people’s beliefs and desires one can identify what behaviour would be 
rational. In both cases the “reasoning” that is imputed to agents is a rational reconstruction based on 
their mental states and the standard of rationality is an “external” one applied to behaviour, not an 
“internal” one applied to decision processes. 
 This is compatible with the way that “reasoning” is used in cognitive science and AI. 
Cognitive science has abandoned classical logic, as logical inference mechanisms are too slow to 
model the “automatic” information processing that is antecedent to decision. While manipulation of 
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propositions may be a suitable model at Marr’s (1982) computational level, where the goal of the 
system and the logic behind its output are specified, it is a less good model at the algorithmic level, 
representing and implementing the computational theory, and at the level of implementation, or how 
the algorithm is realised in the brain. Instead we have the idea that people can implicitly reason 
according to some rule without explicitly being able to articulate the content of their reasoning 
(Polanyi, 1962), 
 In the literature on team reasoning, Hurley (2005b) has explicitly taken this line. She 
investigates local procedures and heuristics from which collective units of agency can emerge, and 
she argues that the processes in an agent that actually generate his or her rational behaviour need 
not be isomorphic with the theoretical account of why the behaviour counts as rational. Bacharach 
also denies conscious access to reasoning processes, saying, “We should not expect people to be 
able to identify the reasoning principles that govern their conclusions even when these principles 
are sound” (Bacharach 2006:45). Team reasoning models the computational level: the goal of the 
system and the logic behind the output. Therefore the claim that team reasoning leads to collective 
intentions should be understood as the idea that the team goal and logic of team reasoning underpin 
behaviour resulting from collective intentions. 
  
6. Testing team reasoning  
 Tests of team reasoning have been tests of behaviour (as would be expected from the 
discussion in Section 5), testing hypotheses about how team reasoners will behave in various 
games, usually pitted against a leading alternative theory. In order to predict behaviour, some 
assumptions must be made about team goals and group identification, as discussed in Sections 2 
and 4. It must also be possible to make predictions from the financial payoffs that are observable in 
the lab. 
 We would expect that team reasoners would be more likely to cooperate in mixed-motive 
games, like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, than the individual reasoners of rational choice theory. 
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However, it is difficult to isolate the effect of team reasoning in such games. The predictable effects 
of group identification include increased inter-personal affect amongst group members and an 
increased expectation of cooperation by other group members (both of which might also 
“transform” the financial payoffs, so that the effective payoffs that motivate a player’s behaviour 
are different from the observed financial outcomes). Each of these, altruism and expectations, is the 
basis of alternative theories of cooperation. It’s not clear how we can measure which proposed 
correlates of group identification—team reasoning, in-group altruism, or expectation that others will 
cooperate—is causal.2 
 Luckily, co-ordination may be more fundamental that cooperation. Theories of cooperation 
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma that invoke payoff transformations or expectations and social norms turn 
(cooperate, cooperate) into an equilibrium but do not change the status of (defect, defect), which 
remains an equilibrium. (For more detailed explanation of this, see Gold and Sugden, 2007b or 
Gold, 2012.) In other words, coordination is still necessary; often the game becomes a Hi-Lo. Co-
ordination games are also attractive for other reasons. There is no problem with identifying the 
observed laboratory payoffs with the utility payoffs that motivate people because the players’ 
payoffs are equal in all outcomes, so it is safe to assume that all players have the same preference 
ordering over the outcomes. This also means that the team’s objective is not controversial in co-
ordination games. 
 However, we’re remarkably good at co-ordination, especially Hi-Lo!3 If the hypothesis is 
that team reasoning causes co-ordination on (high, high), then the experimenter needs to get a low 
baseline level of coordination on that outcome in order to see an effect of team reasoning. Hence, in 
order to test team reasoning, people have tried to make coordination harder. They have done this in 
three different ways. 
																																																								
2 Colman et al. (2008, 2014)  use prisoner’s dilemma type games to pit team reasoning against individual reasoning. As 
well as the confounds identified above, Sugden (2008) has pointed out that subjects’ behaviour in the experiments 
would also be predicted by another theory of coordination, cognitive hierarchy theory. See Karpus and Gold (2016) for 
more discussion. 
3 See tasks NA6 and NA8 in Bardsley et al. (2010), where 54 out of 56 subjects (96 per cent) chose Hi. 
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 Bacharach and Guerra (reported in Ch.4 of Bacharach, 2006) made coordination harder by 
making one of the low paying options salient. Bacharach took the main competitor theory to be the 
idea of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) that people play high because the high payoff makes it salient, 
call this payoff salience. In that case, it should be possible to induce people to choose low by 
labelling low in a manner that makes it more salient. Call this label salience. For instance, one could 
give the two strategies flower names, calling the low paying strategy “rose” and informing people 
that in previous experiments, “rose” was the most common choice. If that produced a significant 
amount of low choice, then it would be possible to test whether group identity manipulations make 
high choice more likely. Using a design like this, Bacharach and Guerra ran a small pilot that 
provides modest support for team reasoning. 
 A second way to make coordination harder is to increase the number of options, as done by 
Bardsley et al. (2010) and Bardsley and Ule (2014). A third possibility is to make the payoffs 
asymmetric, as done in two experiments by Faillo, Smerilli, Sugden (2013, 2015). Both sets of 
experimenters pitted team reasoning against cognitive hierarchy theory, where players are 
individualistic reasoners and where coordination is supposed to be the result of beliefs abut the 
other players. The theory assumes that there is some very basic strategy, such as choosing at 
random or choosing according to label salience or choosing according to payoff salience—which 
one depends on the version—that is done by level-zero players. Then level-one players assume all 
other players are level-zero and play a best response against that strategy; level-two players play a 
best response to level-one players; and in theory so on ad infinitum, although in practise no-one has 
found anything higher than level-two reasoners. These four experiments have mixed results, which 
are hard to explain within a unified theory. For more detailed examination and discussion see 
Karpus and Gold (2016). But it is hard to conclude anything on the basis of so few experiments. 
More research is needed. 
 
6. Other levels of agency: the person over time 
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 In decision theory, problems of intertemporal choice are often analyzed as if, at each time t 
at which the person has to make a decision, that decision is made by a distinct transient agent or 
timeslice, the person at time t. Each timeslice is treated as an independent rational decision-maker, 
so that “the individual over time is an infinity of individuals” (Strotz, 1955: 179). This does not 
imply any metaphysical commitments, in particular it is not an endorsement of perdurantism, the 
view that things really do consist of temporal parts. Rather, it is a natural way of modelling people 
because the self at a particular time is the locus of choices, experiences, and perceptions.  
 This generates a neat model of giving in to temptations and procrastination (O’Donaghue 
and Rabin, 1999): A timeslice makes a choice that benefits itself (going out, eating dessert) but 
imposes costs on future selves (failing the exam, not getting into that dress); even if the timeslice 
cares about future selves, that may not be enough to get her to make a sacrifice for them. This way 
of thinking about the self is not alien to philosophers. It is the view put forward in Parfit (1984), 
who argues that it is only rational for the current self to take into account her future outcomes to the 
extent that she is “connected” to the future self. 
 The decision theoretic picture does not include intentions (and, in this, it differs from Parfit, 
1984). Agency is vested in timeslices, who each act on their own preferences, and it is considered 
naive to think that an earlier timeslice could motivate her later self to do something just by forming 
a plan. And even agents who are sophisticated enough to recognise their own self-control problems 
can end up procrastinating (O’Donaghue and Rabin, 1999). 
 These self-control problems have a similar structure to the puzzles that motivated the 
development of interpersonal team reasoning. So we can give a similar solution: intra-personal team 
reasoning, or the idea that the timeslices can see themselves as constituting a “team over time” and 
act on team reasoning (Gold, 2013). Being a part of a team over time can give an earlier self a 
reason to take into account the outcomes of future selves even if she does not feel connected to her 
future self (Gold, 2015). The plan made by the earlier self is the intention and, when a timeslice 
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 I have related the motivation for the theory of team reasoning and explained a basic version. 
I have detailed some controversies within the theory of team reasoning about group identification, 
the rationality of team reasoning, and the team’s objective. I have sketched some open research 
questions and the attempts that people have made in answering them, covering collective intentions 
and reasoning, testing team reasoning, and the application of other levels of agency. Once we admit 
into the theory the possibility that individuals have more than two levels of agency, or are members 
of many different groups, then the question of which team someone identifies with and the inter-
play of different memberships becomes important. However, there is little or nothing on this 
question, which is an obvious direction for future research. 
 
Related Topics 
Collective Action and Agency, Non-reductive views of Shared Intention, Reductive views of 
Shared Intention,  Interpersonal Obligations in Joint Action, Shared values, interests, and desires, 
Joint Commitment, Collective Rationality and Cooperation, Social Groups. 
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